Timaeus and critias pdf

It is impossible, however, to determine the chronological relation between these two dialogues with certainty see note 7 , and thus impossible to infer which of the two schemes Plato might have thought to be the more definitive.

Many commentators on the Timaeus have pointed out that the teleological account set out in the Timaeus is the fulfillment of a quest for teleological explanations related in the Phaedo see, e. Socrates expected the use Anaxagoras made of Intellect to provide teleological explanations; instead, Anaxagoras employed the concept to provide the same sort of causal explanation—in terms of physical interactions—that Socrates had found confusing.

Continuing to hope for teleological causal explanations but finding them elusive, Socrates settles for a second best account: offering causal explanations in terms of participation in Forms Phaedo 99c6 ff. It is not entirely clear by what avenue of reasoning Plato found what his character Socrates failed to find in the Phaedo , but it is reasonable to assume that the role of the form of the Good, introduced in the Republic , assisted in the discovery.

Although the character Socrates in that dialogue declines to offer an account of the nature of the Good, it is not unreasonable to connect that form, as some have done, with rational, mathematical order. Sensibles are good in so far as they participate in these forms, though they fail to do so completely.

What is left to be explained, then, is how such order is manifested in the visible universe, however imperfectly. The explanation offered in the Timaeus is that order is not inherent in the spatio-material universe; it is imposed by Intellect, as represented by the Craftsman. While the figure of the Craftsman seems to be an anthropomorphic representation of Intellect, [ 23 ] it remains to ask what the ontological status of Intellect is, in relation to the division between being and becoming—a distinction that appears to be exhaustive.

Alternatively, either Intellect is a form, or the distinction between being and becoming is not exhaustive. Aristotelian final causes in the formation of organisms and the structures of the natural world are said to be immanent in nature i. Moreover, for Aristotle the development of an individual member of a species is determined by the form it has inherited from its male parent: the goal of the developing individual is to fully actualize that form.

For Plato the primeval chaotic stuff of the universe has no inherent preexisting form that governs some course of natural development toward the achievement of some goal, and so the explanatory cause of its orderliness must be external to any features that such stuff may possess. While the receptacle has an obvious metaphysical role in the Timaeus , its primary role after its introduction is in the physical theory of the dialogue.

The argument from 47e3 to 52d4 gives Timaeus both the spatial matrix in which to situate, and the material substratum from which to constitute, the universe that he will fashion after its eternal model. In that state, dramatically described at 52d4—53c3, the filled space that is the receptacle undergoes constant, erratic motion: it is subject to forces dunameis , 52e2 that are dissimilar to and out of balance with each other, and thus, as each spastic movement produces its chain of spastic reactions, it is perpetually unstable 52e1—5.

The result is a pre-cosmic inchoate stratification of these traces, which anticipates the perpetually incomplete, 58a2—c4 stratification of the finished universe. Timaeus does not say why each face is composed of six such triangles, when in fact two, joined at the longer of the two sides that contain the right angle, will more simply constitute an equilateral triangle.

The faces of the cube are squares composed of four elemental isosceles right-angled triangles and again, it is not clear why four should be preferred to two. Given that every right-angled triangle is infinitely divisible into two triangles of it own type by dropping a perpendicular from the right-angle vertex to the hypotenuse, the resulting two smaller right triangles are both similar to the original triangle the equilateral or square faces of the solids and thus the stereometric solids themselves have no minimal size.

Possibly, then, the choice of six component triangles for the equilateral and four for the square is intended to prevent the solid particles from becoming vanishingly small.

Since each of the first three of the regular solids has equilateral faces, it is possible for any fire, air or water corpuscles to come apart in their interactions—they cut or crush each other—and their faces be reconstituted into corpuscles of one of the two other sorts, depending on the numbers of faces of the basic corpuscles involved.

For example, two fire corpuscles could be transformed into a single air corpuscle, or one air corpuscle into two fire corpuscles, given that the tetrahedron has four faces and the octahedron eight other examples are given at 56d6—e7. In this way Timaeus explains the intertransformation that can occur among fire, air and water.

On the other hand, while the faces of the cube particles may also come apart, they can only be reconstituted as cubes, and so earth undergoes no intertransformation with the other three.

These various arrangements explain the perceptible properties possessed by the varieties of primary bodies and their compounds. It is a fair question to ask how the physics of the discourse relates to its metaphysics—for example, how the perceptible properties of observable instances of fire its brightness, lightness and heat, let us say relate to the form of Fire, an intelligible reality that has no perceptible properties at all.

Although we are not told what it is about the nature of fire that requires observable instances of it to have just these properties, it is presumably that knowledge that guides the Craftsman to select and assign the four regular solids as he does. And so with the other three kinds see 55d7—56c7. Plato inherited from Socrates the conviction that knowledge of goodness has a salvific effect upon human life.

That knowledge remained elusive to Socrates. As Plato continues the Socratic quest, he expands the scope of the search beyond ethical matters. In the Phaedo , as we saw earlier, the character Socrates expresses the conviction that goodness is the true cause aitia of the beneficent arrangement of the natural world, though the nature of goodness continues to elude him as well.

What remains to be articulated is a conception of how cosmic goodness is manifested in the universe so that humans will recognize it, understand it, and emulate it in order that their lives may become truly virtuous and happy. We saw above that in its dramatic context, the Timaeus is the second of a series of three or possibly four see Critias a—b speeches exchanged by four or possibly five see Timaeus 17a friends during one of the yearly Athenian Panathenaic festivals.

And that is indeed what we find. Sattler rub. Overview of the Dialogue 2. An Interpretive Question 3. Relation of the Timaeus to other Platonic Dialogues 4. The Status of the Account 5. Being and Becoming 6. The Receptacle 7. Teleology 8. Physics 9. The reasoning may be represented as follows: Some things always are, without ever becoming 27d6.

Some things become, without ever being 27d6—28a1. If and only if a thing always is, then it is grasped by understanding, involving a rational account 28a1—2. If and only if a thing becomes, then it is grasped by opinion, involving unreasoning sense perception 28a2—3. The universe is visible, tangible and possesses a body 28b7—8. If a thing is visible, tangible and possesses a body, then it is perceptible 28b8. If a thing is perceptible, then it has become 28c1—2; also entailed by 4.

Anything that becomes is caused to become by something 28a4—6, c2—3. The universe has been caused to become by something from 5 and 6. The cause of the universe is a Craftsman, who fashioned the universe after a model 28a6 ff. The model of the universe is something that always is 29a4—5; from 9a—9e. Either the model of the universe is something that always is or something that has become 28a5—29a2, also implied at 28a6—b2.

If the universe is beautiful and the Craftsman is good, then the model of the universe is something that always is 29a2—3. If the universe is not beautiful or the Craftsman is not good, then the model of the universe is something that has become 29a3—5. The universe is supremely beautiful 29a5. The Craftsman is supremely good 29a6. The universe is a work of craft, fashioned after an eternal model 29a6—b1; from 8 and 9. Teleology Many commentators on the Timaeus have pointed out that the teleological account set out in the Timaeus is the fulfillment of a quest for teleological explanations related in the Phaedo see, e.

Physics While the receptacle has an obvious metaphysical role in the Timaeus , its primary role after its introduction is in the physical theory of the dialogue. Ethics Plato inherited from Socrates the conviction that knowledge of goodness has a salvific effect upon human life. Publishers, Burnet, J. IV, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bury, R. Cornford, F. Lee, D. Johansen, Waterfield, R.

Gregory , Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zeyl, D. Secondary Literature: Artmann, B. Barney, R. Brennan and C.

Brittain eds. Betegh, G. Mohr and B. Sattler eds. Brague, R. Brandwood, L. Brisson, L. Naddaf , Chicago: Chicago University Press. Broadie, S. Burnyeat, M. Smiley ed. Waszink ed. Magee ed. Calvo, T. Brisson eds. Carone, G. Cherniss, H. Allen ed. Cooper, J. Kraut ed. DeVogel, C. Dicks, D. Dillon, J. Fletcher, E. Frede, D. Frede and G. Striker eds. Gill, C. Gill, M. Grams, L. Hackforth, R. Hampton, C. Johansen, T. Keyt, D. Kraut, R. Kung, J.

Anton and A. Preus eds. Ledger, G. Lee, E. Werkmeister ed. Lennox, J. Menn, S. Miller, D. Mohr, R. Morrow, G. Mourelatos, A. Mohr, K. Sanders and B. Mueller, I. Penner and R. Kraut eds. Nesselrath, H. Owen, G. Nussbaum ed. Patterson, R. Critias c—d. Thus the goddess prepared the conditions for obtaining human beings who would be in love with both war and wisdom.

The main lesson of the tale can be stated quite succinctly: not bed but workshop is the birthplace of durable virtue. Yet generation after generation, the original divine blood wears thinner and the appetites get more and more insatiable e—b. Unsupported by constant divine care, the splendid and originally virtuous Atlantis is bound to meet its tragic fate.

Why let disappear the steadfast and well-crafted Athens? What supports this reading is the fact that not the Atlantids, but the god started the war. If so, then the death of the Athenians could indeed be understood as a divine prize for their wonderful victory. Plato, however, has his solution at hand: a millennium after she had founded Athens, the goddess was given the land of Egypt, previously situated at the frontier of the Atlantic empire Timaeus 25a—b, Critias c.

This compensation has the taste of poetic justice; moreover, this is how the structure of ancient Athens can resurface and live its second life. He makes them part of a larger plan, itself rich in poetic, and especially Homeric associations. So that this description, which deals with the appearance of greatness, is no doubt complete.

The line d7 is what we have been waiting for: from the outward wealth, it turns our attention to the souls. Yet such a shift requires a thorough change of perspective.

The object of this new kind of description, one of what is invisible, will thus be the moral decadence of Atlantis, which was hidden to human eyes, but perceptible to the mind of Zeus b. Unfortunately, the text stops just there where Zeus would speak out to the assembled gods and explain his decision. Unintentionally, these translations lead to the proximity of Homer rather than Thucydides. The two fundamental and concise studies, important for our understanding of causation and explanation in connection to deliberate actions, are Pearson and David , 50—51, and Pradeau , n.

The motivation of the intentional break just before the speech of Zeus is variously explained by Welliver and Laplace For an overview of approaches to this problem see Nesselrath , — Yet this reference, and many others that could be produced, has one heuristic limit. Here as elsewhere, Thucydides deals with reasons and pretexts that are intimately connected with human feelings and human ambitions.

Traditionally, divine jealousy leads to the destruction of either an individual or a group of humans, this latter category being extendable to an entire population. See VI. The whole discourse about human war as a divine means either to reduce the general number of humans or to get rid of a special human group is an integral part of Greek mythology and poetic tradition.

To a degree, Plato, in the Timaeus—Critias, tries to supersede both of these approaches. Munson , For the whole issue including the war and the destruction of demigods see Scodel The primary object of her analysis, namely the Homeric episodes of the building and then the destruction of the Achaean wall Iliad VII.

Critias d , Poseidon acts as the Earthshaker cf. Iliad VII. On the plan and the will of Zeus, see also Kullmann and Wilson For the role of Zeus as destroyer of mortals in Aeschylus see Golden and Winnington-Ingram The explicit position of the Timaeus—Critias at the crossroad of cosmology and anthropology is why some of the stories to be told do not focus on the goodness of individual lives.

More exactly, they imply that a tension may arise between the intellectual perfection of human individuals and the perfection of the cosmos whose completeness depends on the transformations of mortal species. As the intellectual perfection connects to the motions of celestial immortals, the resulting break between the intellect and the existence of mortal bodies is deep and clearly anticipates upon the Aristotelian distinction of sublunary and supralunary spheres.

In this respect, I wish to take up the distinction indicated by Timaeus himself, one between 1 gods who are visible and whose origin is accounted for in transparent causal terms linked to the craft-like activity; and 2 gods who make themselves visible if they want to and whose origin is unclear but some people link it to sexuality these are the traditional gods including the Olympians.

One of the safe things to say is that the only god posited as an entirely uncaused cause, also described as both a purposeful and a moving one, is the Demiurge. In the logic of the Timaeus—Critias, this description is not contradictory, despite the bewilderment of Aristotle and other readers at the asymmetry of generation without destruction.

It simply contradicts our experience of physical objects that, being born or constructed, happen to die or break down. Not really, at least not as far as, on this point, the physics is explicitly subordinate to the will of the Demiurge whom Plato lets to declare 87 There is one residual unclarity: who are the gods mentioned in the Critias b3—4?

Brisson , n. Now even those who prefer to take the Demiurge for a metaphor should be clear about what this metaphor stands for. A long tradition takes it that behind the talk about the Demiurge, his will and his creation, Plato would hide a discourse about the eternal natural order.

Yet the alleged metaphor is designed so as to stress the practical deliberation and individual moral goodness as conditions necessary for every imposition of true order on the material world. So that the metaphor, if any, comes close to the literal meaning: it leads us, as I said already, to the ontologically opaque realm of the deliberating mind and to the metaphysical puzzle of the artefacts. And cf. By the same token, they lose sight of how the capacity of deliberation extends to the level of the lesser gods that create the mortal parts of men and organize human cities.

On the one hand, there are the ensouled celestial bodies, and also the global structure of the created cosmos, that furnish us with the model of a perfect justice attainable and imitable by theoretical intellect. A potter or architect does not and cannot craft their product by rigorous reasoning. The Divine Craftsman is in the same situation but on a vastly larger scale. I wish to thank Jakub Jirsa for reminding me of this passage. To this question, I wish to plead a negative answer.

The two decisions, namely to act rather than not to act, and to do A rather than B, need not collapse into one. Having decided to act, he still has the choice between various courses of action as so many means of achieving his aim. Hence the decision not to produce himself the mortal parts of men: he will produce the intrinsically good constituents of the universe, but leave to the lesser gods the making of its extrinsically good parts such as the head, trunk, limbs, sexual organs and so on.

At this point, the Demiurge is weighing the individual lives against the goodness of the whole, and he is fully responsible for the outcome. The possibility to punish and even wipe out the latter by means of wars and cataclysms is only a prolongation of this activity, and not an end in itself.

Now we could analyze this situation in terms of both the freedom of decision and the ethics of doing and allowing. Plato, it was said, uses this strategy so as to distribute various expressions of divine care throughout the physical universe. But what about the mind of the Demiurge? Being good, thus without jealousy, the maker wants everything to become like himself 29e.

The Phaedrus ascribes the lack of jealousy to the gods who mount the heavens a7 and whom the human souls try to follow. The gods of the Phaedrus move with no jealousy for other souls that try to follow then, yet also without any concern for their success or failure. The philosophy of the Symposium is equally unperturbed by all the particular kinds of beauty its new practitioner must have left behind.

I was unable to consult Dickie But we can be fairly sure that, in the well- crafted city of ancient Athens, the citizens themselves are induced to adopt a very similar attitude. If it seems that the Demiurge, the Olympians and the humans share in the capacity to deliberate and to engage in various course of action, the very origin and nature of this capacity remains an entirely open question.

As for the origins of the traditional gods, Olympians included, Timaeus is content with mocking the genealogies of both the Hesiodic and the Orphic type 40d6—41a6.

The object of mockery in this much mistrusted passage is not traditional gods but those men who pretend to know their genealogy. Thus to mock the pretentious genealogies of gods is not the same thing as to reject all talk about the latter.

In the last analysis, the genealogy quoted at 40d6—41a6 may even contain some germ of truth, like for instance the capacity of Earth to produce life. In such a case, he would have made the Olympian gods much more like himself than Earth or even Heavens could ever be.

The point is not that the Timaeus— Critias is a story and no treatise in ontology not every ontology needs to rely on causal accounts.

But I agree with Johansen , , that, in line with this rejection, one could make more of the presentation of the Demiurge as craftsman. Carone , n. In such a case, the homology between the origin of the Olympian gods and men would be remarkably reinforced.

This order, in any case, is not open to a direct synoptical observation either. The role ascribed to the Olympian gods is then part of the accounting for the ordered universe and for the complexity of human nature.

Such a reading, however, need not imply a full-blown creationism of an almost Biblical sort. There is no tension between reading the text literally and suggesting that the Demiurge uses and reworks the existing bits and pieces of a world that, while not being a true cosmos, looked in many respects like the world we inhabit today. In that pre-cosmos, things were already composed of the four main ingredients; there were even living beings not unlike us. In this moral economy of our cosmos, wars and cataclysms seem useful in keeping the balance between the number of good men and the number of bad men.

Such a balance is implied in the admittedly obscure transformation of the three mortal species as described, in the wake of the address to the lesser gods, at 42b—d cf. He is interested in the possible worlds in the modern predominantly logical sense of the term, not in the cosmology of successive universes. In a way, his perspective is closer to those who reject the literal reading of the Timaeus since they are obliged to account for the pre-cosmic state in terms of the present physical universe.

Broadie , 25— 26 and nn. This indicates a proximity to the myth of the Politicus; for various interpretations of the latter see McCabe and again Carone , — More exactly, it would leave many aspects of human life to be grasped in purely negative terms: as deviations from cosmic order.

Rather, we are invited to think again about the possibility that cosmic perfection, political stability and individual virtue may not have exactly the same models. There are necessities of choice in these matters too: not only between good and bad, but also among various goods. On the other hand, the end of even the best of cities need not tarnish the bright appreciation of the intellectual powers proper to thinking individual. The Socratic dimension of the Timaeus—Critias does not follow only from its teleological physics.

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